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Abstract 
Technological advances have had a tremendous impact 
on the development of economy and society in the 
twenty-first century albeit with several security threats as 
well which are yet to be regulated. Many factors 
contribute to digital threats, making countries vulnerable 
and insecure, ranging from a large number of users, the 
intrinsic lack of security architecture, and the global 
nature of cyberspace. Whilst much of the focus is on 
confidence-building to facilitate international co-
operation to facilitate rules-of-the-road, capacity building 
is equally important, though not receiving adequate 
attention because of the focus on great power politics. For 
developing countries, there is a need to ramp up 
capacities to deal with cyber threats. There is much scope 
for South-South cooperation in this regard since many 
developing countries, including India, possess advanced 
digital capabilities. 
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south co-operation, Capacity building, Cyberspace, Cyber threats, 
Vulnerabilities, Malware, Norms, Cybercrime, Cybersecurity, 
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1. Introduction 
For the developing countries, in particular, cyberspace has aided in 
development goals, increased connectivity, and has had a positive 
impact on various fields, from education, to financial inclusion and 
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health. On the flip side, it has also led to destabilisation and 
increased vulnerabilities in many areas, resulting in threats to 
critical information infrastructure, an increase in cybercrime and 
cyber-enabled crime. Further, the dawn of global surveillance 
mechanisms, the militarization of cyberspace, and most recently, 
the absence of digital borders has created opportunities for various 
threat actors to create societal instability through fake news and so 
on. 
The causes of the threats are the result of vulnerabilities in the 
software, hardware, networks and endpoints that make up the 
cyberspace. Whilst technical solutions have mitigated some of those 
threats, they can only go so far, given that there are millions of 
vulnerabilities and a strong criminal enterprise eco-system to 
monetise the sale and misuse of these vulnerabilities. The many 
users of this eco-system range from criminal enterprises to state 
and state-sponsored actors and even the gigantic transnational 
behemoths that make up the tech titans find themselves unable to 
match up to the collective might of the criminal enterprises ranged 
against them. Consequently, it falls on state institutions at a 
national and supra-national level to find ways and means of 
responding to digital threats. However, multi-lateral bodies that 
would traditionally be for a resolution of differences have been 
found wanting, partly because since cyber issues are not purely the 
concern of states but have multiple stake holders spread across a 
multitude of domain areas (Nye,2014). 
2. The Digital Divide 
However, what is often overlooked in the broader discussion of 
threats from the digital world is that developing countries are even 
more vulnerable to these threats than the developed countries. 
Many have lacked the resources and capabilities to ensure that 
their citizens can access these services safely. The digital divide 
manifests itself not just across countries and regions but even 
within countries with some states, even within India, having more 
capabilities and resources to deal with cyber threats more than 
others. These disparities have consequences not only for economic 




growth but also provide opportunities for bad actors to take 
advantage of this borderless space.   
Too often, the developing countries focus on subsets of cyberspace 
such as cybercrime and social media, rather than addressing the 
root cause of the vulnerabilities in cyberspace. The reasons for this 
are many. Cybercrime, as a case in point, fits within the existing 
responsibility of the law enforcement apparatus. Consequently, a 
lot of attention has gone into addressing the gaps, and there are 
many. Most cyber-crime is cross-border in nature, and there has 
been much discussion on the logistics of coordinating across 
borders to collect and retain digital evidence which is easily erased 
or can be subject to manipulation, as well as on more fundamental 
issues such as harmonisation of various laws in these countries to 
enable the law to take its course. 
The global losses due to cybercrime have fluctuated widely since 
there is no verifiable method for measuring cybercrime. A 2018 
report by McAfee in association with the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies gives a figure of $ 600 billion (Signé and 
signé, 2018). In addition to monetary loss, there are other losses 
including a reputational loss to businesses, loss due to theft of 
intellectual property, loss of productivity and legal costs. 
Some aspects unique to developing countries are the low level of 
cyber literacy, especially at the level of individuals which makes 
them easy targets for all manner of social engineering-based crimes. 
Another aspect to be considered is the need to focus on mobile 
security as much as computer security given that most interactions 
and transactions in developing countries take place through mobile 
phones. Mobile vulnerabilities increased by 215% in 2015 over 2014 
according to a report commissioned by the Global Forum on Cyber 
Expertise (Global Forum on Cyber Expertise, 2017). Low-income 
levels also are a cause of computer piracy, in turn leading to 
compromised systems which are then used for bot network 
activities. While botnet infections in India have come down after 
government-led initiatives such as the Cyber Swachhta project to 
clean computers, it is still ranked second in the list of botnet 
infected countries (The Spamhaus Project, n.d). 




However, it is not just the vulnerabilities in the software but the use 
of those not just by cyber-criminals, but also state-sponsored actors 
for purposes ranging from espionage to attacks on critical 
information infrastructure. Attacks have ranged from ransomware 
attacks to Dedicated Denial of Service (DDOS) Attacks. Malicious 
ransomware attacks like Wannacry, Petya and Notpetya were 
rebuffed through a combination of luck and active response by 
governments and tech companies. Whilst Notpetya brought the 
operations of the shipping giant Maersk in India to a halt (Saul, 
2017), several countries in Africa were impacted by the Wannacry 
ransomware (CIO East Africa, 2017). India was affected the most by 
NotPetya in the Asia-Pacific region and was the seventh most 
affected globally. Wannacry was formally attributed to North 
Korea by the US-supported by allies in December 2017 though 
North Korea rejected these allegations. While Petya’s origins were 
murkier, like Wannacry, it was based on an exploit developed by 
the US National Security Agency (NSA) which was leaked in 
March 2017 by the Shadow Brokers, a hacking group believed to be 
affiliated to Russian intelligence. According to reports, North Korea 
is even using the proceeds of cyber-criminal activities carried out 
by its agents as a source of funding for its military and nuclear and 
missile programs. That much of this cannot be conclusively and 
independently verified speaks of the difficulties of applying 
traditional methods of security such as arms control and 
technology denial regimes since these rely on mechanisms centred 
around verifiability. Thus, cyber-attacks need not be targeted to be 
destructive, and more often than not, countries find themselves 
affected as collateral damage. For instance, although, Notpetya was 
targeted at Ukrainian infrastructure, the malware went viral and 
infected computers in more than 65 countries (Chappell, 2017).  The 
absence of borders in cyberspace means that attackers can spoof 
their identities and even basic forensics to arrive at the source of the 
attacks is difficult. However, in the absence of viable alternatives, 
the technologically advanced powers, particularly the United 
States, are seen to be practising a modified form of “cyber” 
deterrence which focuses on imposing sanctions and punitive 
actions on individuals rather than countries (Braw, 2020). Whilst 
this approach has been criticised by some for placing too much 




emphasis on the lower-level operational actors rather than the 
strategic masterminds behind these actions, others see this as the 
only way to go (Braw, 2020:49). 
3. Defining Cybersecurity 
Cybersecurity is much more than cybercrime, and discussion on 
the more fundamental issues is lacking as seen when examining 
even basic definitions which are largely borrowed from elsewhere. 
As far back as 2010, the United Nations Group of Governmental 
Experts (UNGGE) on Developments in the field of Information and 
Telecommunications in the context of International Security, had 
recommended “(v) Finding possibilities to elaborate common terms 
and definitions relevant to General Assembly resolution 64/25” in 
its report to the First Committee of the United Nations (United 
Nations, 2010a). 
The term Cybersecurity is a dynamic concept that has evolved over 
the years from the techno-centric definition put out by the 
International Telecommunications Union to broader all-
encompassing definitions such as the one put out by the US 
Department of Homeland Security. The ITU definition described 
Cybersecurity as follows:  
“Cybersecurity is the collection of tools, policies, security 
concepts, security safeguards, guidelines, risk management 
approaches, actions, training, best practices, assurance and 
technologies that can be used to protect the cyber 
environment and organization and user’s assets. 
Organization and user’s assets include connected 
computing devices, personnel, infrastructure, applications, 
services, telecommunications systems, and the totality of 
transmitted and/or stored information in the cyber 
environment. Cybersecurity strives to ensure the attainment 
and maintenance of the security properties of the 
organization and user’s assets against relevant security risks 
in the cyber environment. The general security objectives 
comprise the following: Availability, Integrity, which may 




include authenticity and non-repudiation, and 
Confidentiality.” (ITU, n.d.) 
The US Department of Homeland Security in its glossary of 
Cybersecurity Terminology defines cybersecurity as follows: 
“Strategy, policy, and standards regarding the security of and 
operations in cyberspace, and encompass[ing] the full range of 
threat reduction, vulnerability reduction, deterrence, international 
engagement, incident response, resiliency, and recovery policies 
and activities, including computer network operations, information 
assurance, law enforcement, diplomacy, military, and intelligence 
missions as they relate to the security and stability of the global 
information and communications infrastructure” (Department of 
Homeland Security, n.d.). These differing, and sometimes 
conflicting definitions are present across the board with the basic 
conflict over what constitutes cyberspace, cybersecurity and other 
related terms yet to be resolved and the number of alternative 
definitions increasing by the year.   
  4. International Efforts  
The establishment of the previously mentioned UNGGE on 
Developments in the field of Information and Telecommunications 
in the context of International Security was pursuant to a resolution 
moved by Russia in 1998 calling on the UN General Assembly to 
examine the issue of information security. The resolution invited 
member states to make known their views on information security, 
come up with basic definitions and ponder on the “advisability of 
developing international principles that would enhance the 
security of global information and telecommunications systems 
and help to combat information terrorism and criminality” (United 
Nations, 1999). 
The first group of governmental experts set up in 2004 by the First 
Committee, one of the UN General Assembly’s six committees, on 
Disarmament and International Security, could not even arrive at a 
consensus on recommendations to be submitted to the 1st 
Committee, with vastly divergent positions taken by Russia and 
China on the one hand, and the US and its European allies on the 
other, on even the issues to be discussed by the GGE. The two-page 




report to the Secretary-General simply noted that “given the 
complexity of the issues involved, no consensus was reached on the 
preparation of a final report” (United Nations, 2005). 
In subsequent iterations, the basic pillars for securing cyberspace 
were conceptualised and sought to be fleshed out. The 2010 GGE 
Report recommended dialogue among States on the norms to 
address collective risks and for protecting the critical national and 
international infrastructure. It also called for measures to promote 
confidence, stability and risk reduction.  The main achievement of 
the next GGE was to have an outcome document that recognised 
that existing international law applied to cyberspace. This, to an 
extent, settled the longstanding debate whether cyberspace 
required new laws taking cognisance of its unique attributes or 
whether existing laws were sufficient.  
The subsequent GGE tried to push ahead on all these tracks; it 
examined how international law applies in cyberspace. It 
recommended voluntary, non-binding norms, rules or principles of 
responsible behaviour of States aimed at promoting an open, 
secure, stable, accessible and peaceful cyberspace.  It further 
elaborated on confidence-building measures and capacity building 
in less developed countries.  The GGE process seems to be on track 
with the recommendations of the 2015 GGE containing clauses that 
reflected concerns and priorities of various countries. Some clauses 
emphasised that state security must go hand-in-hand with respect 
for human rights and fundamental freedoms, others that States 
must not use proxies to mask their activities, and that they must 
ensure that their territories are not used by non-State actors for 
unlawful activities. It was agreed that state sovereignty in 
cyberspace applied to conduct of ICT-related activities, and states 
had jurisdiction over ICT infrastructure within their territory. 
However, despite the veneer of agreement, there were fault lines 
connected not just to cybersecurity but the changing geopolitical 
landscape and the 2016 GGE could not agree on a consensus report, 
dealing a body blow to the UNGGE process which had coalesced 
around rights and duties of states in cyberspace. While earlier 
GGEs had seen an agreement that both were to be derived from 
existing international law, the 2016 GGE had the crucial mandate of 




taking the process forward and spelling out how the laws applied 
as well as fleshing out norms that would fill in the gaps. Further 
progress was stymied for several reasons including mutual 
suspicions on the parts of opposing blocs about the motivations 
and interests of the other. Even if there was no consensus 
agreement on the report, the report itself made some crucial 
recommendations structured around sharing information, state 
responsibility, Human rights, as well as protecting critical 
information infrastructure, supply chain integrity, CERT 
autonomy.  
The eleven recommendations were: 
a) Consistent with the purposes of the United Nations, 
including to maintain international peace and security, 
States should cooperate in developing and applying 
measures to increase stability and security in the use of ICTs 
and to prevent ICT practices that are acknowledged to be 
harmful or that may pose threats to international peace and 
security; 
b) In the case of ICT incidents, States should consider all 
relevant information, including the larger context of the 
event, the challenges of attribution in the ICT environment 
and the nature and extent of the consequences; 
c) States should not knowingly allow their territory to be used 
for internationally wrongful acts using ICTs; 
d) States should consider how best to cooperate to exchange 
information, assist each other, and prosecute terrorist and 
criminal use of ICTs and implement other cooperative 
measures to address such threats. States may need to 
consider whether new measures need to be developed in 
this respect; 
e) States, in ensuring the secure use of ICTs, should respect 
Human Rights Council resolutions 20/8 and 26/13 on the 
promotion, protection and enjoyment of human rights on 
the Internet, as well as General Assembly resolutions 
68/167 and 69/166 on the right to privacy in the digital age, 




to guarantee full respect for human rights, including the 
right to freedom of expression; 
f) A State should not conduct or knowingly support ICT 
activity contrary to its obligations under international law 
that intentionally damages critical infrastructure or 
otherwise impairs the use and operation of critical 
infrastructure to provide services to the public; 
g) States should take appropriate measures to protect their 
critical infrastructure from ICT threats, taking into account 
General Assembly resolution 58/199 on the creation of a 
global culture of cybersecurity and the protection of critical 
information infrastructures, and other relevant resolutions; 
h) States should respond to appropriate requests for assistance 
by another State whose critical infrastructure is subject to 
malicious ICT acts. States should also respond to 
appropriate requests to mitigate malicious ICT activity 
aimed at the critical infrastructure of another State 
emanating from their territory, taking into account due 
regard for sovereignty; 
i) States should take reasonable steps to ensure the integrity of 
the supply chain so that end users can have confidence in 
the security of ICT products. States should seek to prevent 
the proliferation of malicious ICT tools and techniques and 
the use of harmful hidden functions; 
j) States should encourage responsible reporting of ICT 
vulnerabilities and share associated information on 
available remedies to such vulnerabilities to limit and 
possibly eliminate potential threats to ICTs and ICT-
dependent infrastructure; 
k) States should not conduct or knowingly support activity to 
harm the information systems of the authorised emergency 
response teams (sometimes known as computer emergency 
response teams or cybersecurity incident response teams) of 
another State. A State should not use authorized emergency 
response teams to engage in malicious international activity. 




However, even as it seemed that the GGE process had run its 
course, it was resurrected in 2018 when the UN First Committee of 
the General Assembly (GA) adopted two resolutions - one 
establishing the sixth UNGGE (to start in 2019 and report to the 
UNGA in 2021), the other establishing the new Open-Ended 
Working Group (OEWG) (to start in 2019, and report to the UNGA 
in 2020). Whilst the agenda of the former is to expand on the report 
and recommendations of previous GGEs, the OEWG is a different 
mechanism enough mechanism to be complementary and not an 
alternative to the UNGGE, even if their agendas were quite similar.  
The agenda of the UNGGE is as follows: 
to continue to study, to promote common understandings 
and effective implementation, possible cooperative 
measures to address existing and potential threats in the 
sphere of information security, including norms, rules and 
principles of responsible behaviour of States, confidence-
building measures and capacity-building, as well as how 
international law applies to the use of information and 
communications technologies by States, and to submit a 
report on the results of the study. (United Nations, 2018a) 
The agenda of the OEWG is as follows: 
to further develop the rules, norms and principles of 
responsible behaviour of States, and the ways for their 
implementation; if necessary, to introduce changes to them 
or elaborate additional rules of behaviour; to continue to 
study, to promote common understandings, exist and 
potential threats in the sphere of information security and 
possible cooperative measures to address them and how 
international law applies to the use of information and 
communications technologies by States, as well as 
confidence-building measures and capacity-building and to 
submit a report on the results of the study to the General 
Assembly. (United Nations, 2018b) 
The fundamental difference between the two is that the OEWG 
consists of all the member states of the United Nations while the 
UNGGE only has 25 members, selected in such a way as to give 




equal representation to geographic regions. The OEWG is also a 
more open forum and has a mechanism for inputs by civil society 
organisations  
5. Whither the voice of the emerging countries? 
India has been a member of the UNGGE in the very first iteration 
that ran from 2004-05. It was also a member of the 2009-10, 2012-13, 
and 2016-17 Groups. That said, emerging country representation in 
this important apex body for cybersecurity and global internet 
governance has been quite limited. The 2004-05 grouping had 
Brazil, Belarus Jordan, Malaysia, Mexico, Mali and South Africa, 
2009-10 had Belarus, Brazil, India, and South Africa, 2012-13 again 
had emerging country representation from Argentina, Belarus, 
Egypt, India, and Indonesia, while 2014-15 had Belarus, Brazil, 
Colombia, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, and 
the last iteration which had increased membership to 25 had 4 
countries from Africa, Kenya, Egypt, Senegal and Botswana. Even 
if the representation has increased, the less affluent members have 
less capacity to address the multi-faceted and complex issues 
before the GGE and often defer to the arguments made by the big 
powers (Mueller, 2017). 
Low representation by less developed countries is in contrast to 
many of the advanced middle powers like Australia, Netherlands, 
Germany and Switzerland who have astutely built-up capabilities 
and are projecting their positions to ensure a seat at the high table 
global cyber governance, if and when it fructifies. This extends 
from hosting global conferences on cyberspace to funding think-
tank activities and building up offensive and defensive capabilities. 
This has already had results in the UN where these countries have 
invariably been part of successive GGEs over the years. 
This asymmetric representation is not restricted to multi-lateral 
groupings but even in multi-stakeholder groupings such as the 
Internet Governance Forum in which according to a study in 2015 
which looked at representation by geographies noted that 
representation from say, Africa stood at 14 % in the years 2010-15 at 
the annual meetings of the forum compared to 44% from Western 




Europe. Even if cybersecurity issues have occasionally found their 
way into resolutions of developing country fora such as the G77, 
these have been episodic and unsustainable.  Emerging countries 
have also tried to bring their priorities to the fore at ITU led fora 
such as the World Conference on International 
Telecommunications (WCIT) and the World Telecommunication 
Development Conference (WTDC), but these fora have inevitable 
been hijacked by the long-drawn out-conflicts between the 
authoritarian countries such as China and those countries opposed 
to them. The collapse of the World Conference on International 
Telecommunications (WCIT) held in December in 2012 is 
instructive in this regard.  Russia and China were at the forefront of 
proposing various policy measures that ultimately serve to gain 
more control over their national cyberspace. Russia proposed 
under Article 8 that “Member States shall ensure unrestricted 
public access to international telecommunication services and the 
unrestricted use of international telecommunications, except in 
cases where international telecommunication services are used for 
the purpose of interfering in the internal affairs or undermining the 
sovereignty, national security, territorial integrity and public safety 
of other States, or to divulge information of a sensitive nature 
(Mueller, 2017).” Other countries pushed back, resulting in a 
stalemate with a significant number of countries refusing to ratify 
the resolutions to bring internet governance within the ambit of the 
International Tele-communications regulations. The same sequence 
of events again played out at the World Telecommunication 
Development Conference (WTDC) held in Buenos Aires in 2017 
with the final consensus being to leave the 2014 resolution on 
cybersecurity unchanged. According to a report on the Conference, 
“WTDC’s failure to reach agreement on cybersecurity—a topic that 
many other forums have also failed to reach consensus on—was 
framed, particularly by the African group, as an attack on the 
legitimate desire of developing countries to have the same level of 
development as developed countries (Mueller, 2017).” 
5.1 Bridging the Digital Divide: India in Africa 
India has been a strong votary of South-south co-operation which 
refers to technical cooperation among the developing countries in 




the Global South. In a speech to the Ugandan Parliament in 2018, 
Prime Minister Narendra Modi had spelt out India’s guiding 
principles for South-South co-operation and with Africa in 
particular. Amongst others, these included “harness(ing) India’s 
experience with digital revolution to support Africa’s development; 
improv(ing) delivery of public services; extend(ing) education and 
health; spread(ing) digital literacy; expand(ing) financial inclusion; 
and mainstream(ing) the marginalised” and “keeping our 
cyberspace safe and secure.” 
A sample of the memoranda of understanding (MoU) that has been 
signed with African countries elaborates on the type of ongoing 
cooperation (MEITY, n.d-a):  
“The MoU intends to foster active cooperation and 
exchange of knowledge and best practices between private 
entities, institutions involved in enhancing Capacity 
building, Governments and other public and private 
organisations of the two countries in the field of ICT. The 
main areas of cooperation are e-Governance, e-commerce, 
HRD and Capacity building in the ICT sector, electronics 
hardware manufacturing, Information Security etc (MEITY, 
n.d-b).”  
ICT projects that have been undertaken in different countries in 
Africa include the Indo-Ghana Kofi Annan Centre of Excellence for 
Communications and Information Technology (CoEICT) at Accra, a 
Centre of Excellence for Communications and Information 
Technology (CoEICT) at Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania and the India-
Lesotho Centre of Excellence in ICT (ISCEICT) at Maseru, Lesotho 
(MEITY, n.d-c). The Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation 
Programme (ITEC) the flagship bilateral assistance program has 
recently started to offer short-duration technical programs in cyber 
technologies with the 2018 session offering courses at the Centre for 
Development of Advanced Computing (C-DAC), Pune and the 
Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur (MEA, n.d). Earlier sessions 
in 2016 and 2015 had a few courses on cybercrime and cyber 
forensics conducted by Bureau of Police Research and 
Development (MEA, 2017). The ITEC programme sees 5,000 odd 
participants from Africa every year, so this is a major avenue for 




co-operation (Economic Times, 2015). Indian digital initiatives like 
Aadhaar have been advocated by many as a solution to Africa’s 
many problems, with some going to the extent of saying Africa 
would benefit more from Aadhaar than Chinese investments 
(Minter, 2018). The Indian Government has made sporadic efforts 
to promote Aadhaar elsewhere, but the consensus is that 
considering the sensitivities involved with cyber technologies, it is 
better to have countries approach India rather than the other way 
around (Raj and Jain, 2016).  
6. Conclusion 
A large number of users, the intrinsic lack of security architecture, 
and the global nature of cyberspace absent borders make the threat 
landscape much too large to be stabilised through traditional 
methods of mitigating threats such as effective law enforcement, 
and controls and regulations on the civilian side.  The complexity 
and multi-layered nature of cyberspace also make international co-
operation difficult to achieve, nonetheless, it has to be persisted 
with, in the absence of any alternative. Capacity-building efforts 
need to be expanded so that less developed countries can ramp up 
their defences against the digital threats. There is much scope for 
South-South cooperation since any developing countries also 
possess advance digital capabilities. The propensity of states to turn 
to the militarization of cyberspace as a fallback option to ensure 
that they have some means of securing their portion of cyberspace 
by building up offensive capabilities to deter any unwarranted 
actions by hostile actors is leading to a mutually reinforcing 
escalatory chain with no end in sight as new technologies bring 
new options and capabilities to the fore. With the current trajectory, 
states and their actions and inactions will be the main source of 
threats to the digital world unless urgent corrective action is taken. 
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